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PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR: I just wanted to start out thinking a 
little bit about the Horton case. When I first heard of it and first 
started reading it, I have to say I was disappointed. I am the director 
of the Center for Jury Studies. I believe in the right to trial by jury—
and especially the civil jury. But I was not overly surprised. And this 
was coming out of some research that we had done at the National 
Center for State Courts looking at what happens to judgments and 
verdicts from bench and jury trials on appeal. The National Center 
had some periodic research that we’ve done, called our Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts that typically has gone out and looked at bench 
and jury trials across a broad swath. You know, the study I’m 
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thinking about was forty-six large urban courts. It’s since been 
expanded to about 122 courts across the country. And the study that 
we looked at—there were about 8000 jury trials, about fifteen percent 
of which ended up going up on appeal. 
And interesting, looking at this, this is on appeal in twenty-two 
states—thirty-three individual intermediate appellate courts and 
courts of last resort across the country. And the rate of appealing 
bench and jury trials was about equal, about fifteen percent. But there 
was some interesting divergence there. Plaintiffs were significantly 
more likely to appeal from a bench judgment (a judgment in a bench 
trial), while the defendants were significantly more likely to appeal 
from a jury verdict. So we have that sort of interesting divergence 
going on. 
About forty-three percent of these cases that went up on appeal 
ended up not going forward. They were either withdrawn or they were 
dismissed for some type of procedural reason. But we had fifty-seven 
percent of those cases, 1200 cases, that ended up being decided on the 
merits. And you see some very interesting trends there. 
The first one was that these intermediate appellate courts—and this 
is probably where most of the work is going because [these courts] 
actually had mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from civil cases in 
most of these states—these intermediate appellate courts were three 
times more likely to reverse or modify a jury verdict than they were a 
bench judgment. And they were two times more likely to reverse or 
modify the judgment or the verdict when the defendant was the 
appellant. So at the trial court level, you had a plaintiff who had 
prevailed—at the trial court level. And when I first saw that (I mean 
these were like really obvious trends from the data), and I was at first 
a little surprised, and that this curious thing that in this bench trial, 
you’ve got some type of an opinion that has the explanation for what 
the decision was and how the judge applied the law and what the 
evidence was that he or she found persuasive, so you’ve actually got a 
much broader basis on which to disagree. (And so, as opposed to a 
jury trial, [where] a verdict would just be either liability or no 
liability, and damages—kind of that absence of an explanation for 
how the jury actually did that.) 
Now, traditionally we think . . . one of the strengths of a jury 
verdict is that they don’t have to explain—you don’t have a basis, as 
I’ve seen in other countries, to be able to go in and say, “well they 
were clearly wrong in how they approached their decision making.” 
That’s been one of the big criticisms, for example, of special 
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interrogatories in civil verdicts. That it just creates an opportunity for 
mucking around after the fact. But I think that may be part of the 
explanation for why the appellate courts—the appellate bench—
seems so willing to substitute its judgment or to second guess that 
there is no explanation. So they’re willing to give some discretion to 
their colleagues on the trial court bench because they said, “well, I 
probably wouldn’t have gone that way, but I at least recognize the 
logic of the reasoning.” So there’s that piece of it, of how the 
appellate bench is second guessing some of these jury verdicts. 
Another piece of that, though, if you started really digging into the 
data, we had either it was affirmed in whole, or it was reversed in 
part, or whole, or modified, or remanded or something like that, and 
so, looking at these cases that got reversed, we started digging in a 
little bit on what [the alleged error was.] What is it that it was actually 
looking at? And interestingly enough on the jury trials, the ones that 
were being reversed, [they] were actually comparatively rare to see 
the appellate bench overturning verdicts that had to do with the actual 
liability. So if the alleged error was just the insufficiency of the 
evidence supporting liability, that one was being reversed only about 
thirteen percent of the time. It was money—on damages. The 
sufficiency of the evidence on damages that was being overturned 
about thirty-one percent of the time, so almost three times the rate. 
Or, [it was] a proxy. Sometimes it was not actually after the jury’s 
verdict. It was after there had been a post-judgment motion for 
remittitur that had been denied. And so the actual appeal, alleged 
error, was that the trial judge was wrong in not granting the remittitur. 
And so we saw some of that going on. 
So we get this really curious focus that the appellate bench really 
doesn’t trust juries on money. OK on liability, but [the appellate 
bench] really doesn’t trust juries on money. And I wonder how much 
of that is coming out of the research. We know in terms of just the 
instructions that we give jurors about damages, and particularly 
noneconomic damages, that almost everywhere across the country 
there is very little direction. It’s a completely subjective make-the-
plaintiff-whole [instruction]. Make the injured person whole. But we 
don’t really have a common metric for what that means monetarily. 
It’s very subjective. The pain and suffering is worth $25,000? Half a 
million? If we’re looking at punitive damages, which by definition 
means we want to punish someone, do you punish them with 
$10,000? Do we punish them with $10 million? So it’s a very 
subjective decision that we ask juries to do, and so I wonder if some 
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of the ambivalence that Dean Chemerinsky was talking about is the 
fact that as a society we really don’t know how to deal with this 
amorphous thing. How do we convert restitution and/or punishment 
into monetary terms? I think that may be part of what is going on. 
The study that we did at the National Center was actually prompted 
by an earlier one that Ted Eisenberg, and I think it was Michael 
Claremont at Cornell Law School, had done on federal court appeals 
from bench and jury trials a number of years ago. And one of their 
conclusions—because they had exactly the same types of trends in 
their data—was that the appellate bench was actually biased against 
juries. And in fact, they justified their own bias because they actually 
suspected that the trial bench was biased for juries and for plaintiffs. 
And so they were just compensating so that you would actually have 
an even playing field there. Now that’s kind of curious because when 
we look at judge-jury agreements—which is a fairly common metric 
that’s used in jury research—how often does the trial judge say that, 
had it been a bench trial, it would have agreed with the verdict that 
the jury came out with? And that is traditionally very high. It typically 
runs between seventy-five and eighty-five percent, and it’s been that 
way since the 1950s when we first started using this metric. So there’s 
a lot of agreement there. And so part of me . . . think[s] that maybe 
the appellate bench is just too far away—too far removed—that they 
don’t trust juries because they don’t actually have the day-to-day 
experience of the wisdom that comes from the juries. 
And I do want to make one last point and then pass it on. One of 
the things that we see in terms of juror decision making—particularly 
when jurors are given a lot of discretion and not a lot of guidance on 
how they’re to decide—is that they will fundamentally interpret the 
evidence and interpret the law that they’re given to apply in a way 
that results in what is an objectively fair verdict according to those 
community norms, wherever that trial is taking place. And this is one 
of the fundamental rationales on why we have jury trials. This idea 
that this is an opportunity for the community to inject the judicial 
process with community values. And it means that the judicial branch 
actually stays really firmly grounded in sort of what are the norms of 
what we consider justice—what we consider fair. And so one of the 
things that concerns me about Horton, and concerns me about the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the decision not to incorporate 
the Seventh Amendment (and to take the Seventh Amendment as 
seriously as it does the Sixth Amendment), is that it allows the courts 
to develop law that is not necessarily grounded in where our 
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communities are and what our communities think is fair. And I don’t 
think we have to look very far, if you’re paying attention to current 
events right now, to be able to see some of the implications in terms 
of public distrust of our government[al] institutions, including our 
courts. [There is] a sense that those institutions are rigged, that they 
are protecting the elites, and [there are] very entrenched government 
interests. And so a lot of this implication, the failure to take the 
Seventh Amendment seriously, to allow the judgments of juries to be 
maintained, and to be respected is really undermining, in a very real 
sense, the judicial branch to its detriment. 
HON. MICHAEL WOLFF: Justice Christine Durham and I are going 
to have a little conversation. We started last night talking about the 
study done of U.S. Supreme Court arguments that found that women 
Justices were much more likely to be interrupted by male justices. So 
I take the conversation invitation with a bit of a warning. [Audience 
laughter.] 
HON. CHRISTINE DURHAM: We decided we’re both chronic 
interrupters so it should go fine. 
WOLFF: It goes with the territory of being an appellate judge. And 
what I found remarkable about that, by the way, and this is a little 
practice tip—there are a lot of people who are advocates who are 
interrupting women justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
Think about that. 
DURHAM: Don’t ever do that. [Audience laughter.] 
WOLFF: Anyway, I wanted to start with, from my perspective, a 
couple of things. We have similar provisions in our constitution to the 
ones that were interpreted in the Horton case. And the first of the 
modern cases on jury trials is one that I wrote. There was a statute, the 
Missouri Human Rights Act, which gave remedies for employment 
discrimination. The statute was passed with a right to jury trial in it. 
Governor Ashcroft—remember him?—vetoed it, saying there 
shouldn’t be a jury. So the legislature passed it without reference to a 
jury. A couple of court of appeal[s] decisions along the way, over the 
last several years, said that was OK. And then in 2000 or so, when I 
was on the court, we took a writ case and made this applicable 
because—and the analogy that’s applied—in an action for damages 
that’s what the statute provided for, to go back and analyze whether 
this was the kind of remedy available at the common law. Well 
obviously the common law availability in 1820, which is when our 
state came into the Union—remember the Missouri Compromise, 
that’s a little history quiz—there wasn’t any law against employment 
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discrimination, but there were actions for damages for intentional 
wrongs, which is essentially what we’re talking about. Now, so we 
decided, and it was unanimous, and there were people from both sides 
of the aisle that joined in this. 
The next issue of course is caps. And that is, does a cap on 
damages interfere with the right to a jury trial because it’s, in effect, a 
reexamination of what the jury has found? And we now have kind of 
a situation where—and I’ll get into this a little bit, but I’ll let Justice 
Durham talk a little bit about this before—we struck down the caps, 
or the court did after I left, but they used the concurrence that I wrote, 
so I’m happy about that. That if you have a jury that awards this much 
[holds up hands], and the statutory cap takes it down this much 
[moves upper hand], you’re taking away, you’re legislating away, part 
of the jury’s determination. So that was fine for personal injury cases. 
What about wrongful death? Wrongful death is a statutory cause of 
action, and our jurisprudence says that it is something that did not 
exist at common law. So, low and behold, this is again after I left, 
there’s a decision that says wrongful death is subject to the cap on 
noneconomic damages. I have some advice for you tortfeasors: make 
sure they’re dead because if they’re still alive the damages are not 
capped. 
One other thing, just in terms of the language of the constitutional 
provision, what we’re talking about is something that is always 
subject to the historical analysis because in our constitution and in the 
constitution of Oregon it says that the right to jury trial shall remain 
inviolate. That says, “let’s go back and look and see what’s remaining 
inviolate”—some say shall be preserved, some say shall not be 
infringed—it’s always an invitation to go back and look at what the 
history was in terms of actions at common law. 
I made the point in the Diehl case,1 one of the employment 
discrimination cases, that “remain inviolate” is like an exclamation 
point, as opposed to just preserved or shall not be infringed. I mean, 
“remain inviolate” sounds a hell of a lot more serious, you know, to 
those of us who are language fanatics. 
[Turns to Justice Durham] Thank you for not interrupting. 
DURHAM: I was good! I am delighted to be here in Oregon. I have 
to say that, for many years, I have cited opinions out of the Oregon 
Supreme Court with favor. I’m not going to be citing this one. And I 
wanted to thank particularly Dean Chemerinsky for his excellent 
 
1 State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. 2003). 
JURY TRIAL RIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018  1:22 PM 
698 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 691 
contextual look at sort of what’s happened historically in this country 
vis-à-vis jury trials in particular. I’m not at all certain that the 
ambivalence—that has grown up around the federal system—is 
entirely reflective of the state system. I think the states have, from the 
beginning, taken the notion of the jury in civil cases a little bit more 
seriously than our federal counterparts, although I think we are at a 
junction and a crossroads in that respect because of the elements that 
he described—in terms of the attacks on the jury system [and] the rise 
of [alternative dispute resolution] clauses in the most minute places, 
in the most minute contracts. [It] is a very serious problem. 
I’ve been fighting a bit of a rear guard action on my own court in 
my own state. We have a jury clause provision that’s somewhat 
interesting in that it does say that the right to jury trial in capital cases 
shall be inviolate; it doesn’t go on to say anything about the right to 
jury trial otherwise except that it goes on to provide, in significant 
detail, what the legislature can do with the size of juries. In other 
words you need a jury of twelve persons for this, no fewer than eight 
persons for this, and so on. And then the last sentence of our clause 
says a jury trial in civil case shall be waived unless demanded. So the 
right to jury trial is clearly there by inference, but what’s interesting 
to me about that is that we have never taken account of any 
distinction in our case law relating to the fact that in capital cases it’s 
overt and in civil cases it’s by inference. We have always held that the 
jury trial, in civil cases, is a fundamental right. We actually just 
upended part of our system recently in that we’ve had a series of 
statutes going back about ten [to] fifteen years trying to reform the 
small claims courts and the justice courts and to eliminate the permit 
for small claims to get de novo review in the trial court but without 
juries. And somebody finally came along and challenged it, and we 
said, “[we] can’t do it, the constitution will not permit you to deprive 
[someone], even one who is in small claims court, of a jury trial if 
they don’t waive it.” So we’ve taken it very seriously, except with 
respect to damage caps. 
In a case decided about thirteen years ago, wherein I dissented, the 
court upheld a challenge to our damage caps. And let me preface that 
by saying Utah—you know, you talk about black holes for defendants 
around the country—is a black hole for plaintiffs. We have, I think, 
the lowest damage cap in medical malpractice cases in the nation. 
Want to guess? $450,000. $450,000 in medical malpractice cases. 
WOLFF: For everything? 
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DURHAM: For everything. Well, I’m sorry, for noneconomic 
damages. I beg your pardon. Not economic damages, [there] you get 
what you get. But noneconomic damages [the cap is] $450,000. Not 
only that, but Utah, the last time a study was done, which was I think 
about five years ago, we had the lowest median jury verdicts in the 
nation. Is this still true, Bob? 
ROBERT PECK: Umm, I think it is. 
DURHAM: Yeah. 
PECK: But California and several other states have a $250,000 cap. 
DURHAM: Oh, I did not know that. Well, OK, I feel a little better 
then. The majority in our case held under equal protection that—part 
of what I dissented against was the extreme deference that the court in 
that case gave to the open courts provision—the remedy provision of 
our open courts clause afforded extreme deference to legislative fact 
finding. This is something that Bob has, and others have, looked at 
extensively. And decided that reducing healthcare costs required 
some kind of action in the forum of medical malpractice cases. Now 
there are a number of problems. I’ve actually wondered, in some 
respects, why the equal protection arguments in state courts have not 
had more legs, in the sense that you have causes of action that are 
severely limited particularly in terms where you have high damages 
and quality of life scenarios. I think it’s in an article that Bob wrote a 
number of years ago. He cites the research [that] demonstrates the 
invidious impact of those damages in cases involving certain kinds of 
injuries and certain kinds of plaintiffs—not surprisingly, women. 
In assault cases, sexual assault cases, infertility [cases], and 
damages associated with quality of life, [the damages] are regarded—
and certainly regarded by the majority in our case—as being soft 
damages, as being not worth much in a pecuniary sense. Now it’s 
very interesting. We don’t have the wrongful death problem in our 
state because wrongful death is actually enshrined—damages for 
wrongful death are actually enshrined—in our constitution. So they’re 
protected, but we recently had a case in which we had to decide 
whether noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases were 
“pecuniary” damages within the meaning of the constitution and the 
subsequent statutes. We decided they were. We decided that because 
juries were asked to reduce those damages to monetary amounts they 
qualify as pecuniary damages. But I think one of the things that 
underlies this whole debate is the profound disrespect for quality-of-
life damages. And yet every single one of us who have experienced a 
blow in our own personal lives, with respect to quality of life, know 
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how painful that can be and know that the results for an individual 
who has experienced this are extreme. 
One of the things that has concerned me in this arena is—what’s 
been going on to a significant extent, it seems to be—what I regard as 
the impermissible shifting of the burden of dealing with the so-called 
medical malpractice crisis; the rising costs of health care, to one of 
the most voiceless and burdened segments of our society. Now I 
suspect this is a room with some plaintiffs’ lawyers in it, and I know 
I’m preaching to the choir in that respect, but it strikes me that they 
are the ones who are being deprived of the massive—the most 
severely injured victim is the one who is going to get the least 
percentage of recovery. And therein I think lies a very interesting 
equal protection problem. 
One of the things I was most struck with in the Horton opinion was 
where—and this goes back to the jury trial issue, and then I’ll stop, 
and we can see where we are—the Horton majority says that they’re 
talking about the right of  
legal limits on a jury’s assessment of civil damages have been and 
remain an accepted feature of our law. To be sure, statutory 
damages caps differ from other types of legal limitations . . . . They 
specify, as a matter of law, a numerical limit on the amount of 
damages that a party can recover instead of describing that limit 
generically by using a phrase such as foreseeable damages or 
damages proximately caused . . . . However, the two types of 
limitations do not differ in principle. Each limits, as a matter of law, 
the extent of the damages that a jury can award.2  
So what they’re conflating is the notion of the definition of a claim, 
the elements of a claim for recovery, and a limitation on the damages 
that can be restored. I think, of course, those are different and should 
not be conflated. Fact finding regarding what the damages are is not a 
jury determination of whether the elements of the claim has been met. 
And to the extent that—and the other thing that struck me about the 
Horton decision was the conflation of the idea—the jury can find 
damages of X amount but can only award damages of Y amount. 
Well, there’s a degree of which, or the sense in which the jury doesn’t 
award anything, it’s the court’s order of judgment that reduces the 
jury’s verdict to an award. And so therein, of course, lies the 
separation of powers argument that what the legislature has done is to 
constrain the court’s entry of an award based on the jury’s judgment. 
 
2 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 245, 376 P.3d 998, 1041 (2016). 
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And I’d just say to Paula [Hannaford-Agor], by the way, some of 
us appellate judges used to be trial judges. We like juries a lot, but 
apparently, we’re not in the majority. Thank you. 
WOLFF: And you have to remember, the learning in my state is 
that the function of the appellate court [is] to enter the battlefield after 
the battle has been fought and shoot the wounded. 
One of the things that occurred to me just as you were ending with 
your last point is, do you tell the jury about the caps? Or do you just 
say to the jury, “determine the damages and then the judge applies.” 
In our state, the judge applies the caps. So it is, I think overtly, a 
separation of powers problem because it’s the legislature taking the 
judicial function upon itself. Now, the Supreme Court of Missouri has 
rejected that point. I’m happy to say that my successor on the court 
wrote a dissent, in which he picked up on that, and I think it was 
appropriately said. 
PECK: Erwin [Chemerinksy] invoked Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America.3 And in the final edition of that book during 
his lifetime, de Tocqueville added a preface in which he wrote that if 
the lights that guide us are to fade, they will dim as if of their own 
accord because wise procedures and rights that we think are important 
will fade from memory, and we will not apply them. That kind of 
diminishment of our understanding of the right to trial by jury is quite 
evident and, really, are part of what Erwin’s remarks were about. 
It is something that Hugo Black, before he was Chief Justice, as a 
Justice, [and] William Rehnquist, both noted. They noted that 
increasingly there is a judicial invasion of the province of the jury that 
needs to be worried about because if any right were more important to 
those who framed the Constitution and founded our country, it was 
the civil jury right. It was contained in more petitions from the states 
to the Congress about what ought to be in the Bill of Rights. And as 
Justice Story said, it was the most salient of the arguments against the 
ratification of the Constitution—so much so that Hamilton wrote that 
if there was one thing that friends and opponents of the Constitution 
agreed on, it was the importance of the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases.4 
With that background, it is hard to look at the right to trial by jury 
as a mere procedural right, as the Horton court concluded. It took a 
 
3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Daniel C. Gilman ed., 1898) 
(1835). 
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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fractured version of history and of the array [of cases] within the 
country in order to reach that conclusion. I’d like to start somewhat 
backwards from the majority opinion by looking a little at the federal 
cases that it did not cite. And what it did is it looked at a bunch of 
federal courts of appeals decisions, which upheld caps often in light 
of the fact that the Seventh Amendment was not incorporated to apply 
to the states. (As an aside, I will mention that in January I argued a 
case in the Eighth Circuit on that point precisely, and we’re still 
awaiting a decision on that issue.) But if you look at the McDonald 
case,5 written by Justice Scalia, which incorporated the Second 
Amendment, all the criteria he cited—on why the Second 
Amendment was fundamental and deserved, under the Duncan v. 
Louisiana criteria,6 to be incorporated—applies even more so to the 
Seventh Amendment. So, what the Horton court ignored was the 
debate that came out of Tull v. United States, a 1987 decision under 
the Clean Water Act.7 And in that case the Court decided that because 
this statutory cause of action set the damages that are collectible that 
indeed the jury could come to its own conclusion about damages, but, 
applying the law to it, the court could come to a decision consistent 
with the statutory mandate. As a result, a number of cases that were 
cited by the Horton majority relied on Tull to come to the conclusion 
that the jury simply is deciding facts, and the legal import of those 
facts were being then imposed by the judge. 
All of this came to a halt really with a 1998 case called Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures.8 It was a unanimous decision written by Justice 
Thomas, and the winning advocate in that case happened to be a 
fellow named John Roberts, who now, I think, is Chief Justice. 
Anyway, in that [case], what they argued is that Tull took some pains 
to distinguish between statutory causes of action because the 
legislature’s creating something that did not exist before. The Clean 
Water Act was not a feature of the common law, and so they define 
the extent of liability. However, in those causes of action that were 
recognized at common law as of 1791, when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified, were within the province of the jury. And so therefore, you 
apply a historical test—the historical test that every state uses to 
define its jury right in its state constitution. And what were the types 
of cases that were submitted to juries at that time? 
 
5 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
6 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
7 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
8 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). 
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But secondarily, the Constitution is more than just a traffic light. 
It’s more than just a right to have an audience when you try your case. 
What was the province of the jury? What was the extent of their 
prerogatives and their authority? If you are to reflect and preserve the 
right to trial by jury as it existed, and it’s that second part that the 
opinion spends a great deal of time on. And they cite a number of 
English common law cases saying that these are the cases that really 
ought to guide us, and those cases specifically say that the jury is the 
judge of damages. Any interference with that right really does not 
preserve the Constitution. So Tull may be correct with respect to 
statutory causes of action but not to those that were recognized under 
the common law of that time. And if you look at some of the federal 
cases, you can look at an 1851 decision, Day v. Woodworth,9 in which 
the court does respect the jury’s authority to make the decisions as a 
factual determination of what the damages are and what the 
compensation ought to be. And it says that, though the jury has been 
controversial for some time, many think that it ought not make it the 
standard practice, and the experience that we have had so far marks 
the damages decision a commitment to the jury. 
You move up to 1915, and the Supreme Court again talks about 
how damages are the province of the jury. And so when, in 2001, the 
Supreme Court decided to take punitive damages and give them a 
different treatment than it gives to compensatory damages, in Cooper 
Industries v. Leatherman,10 there is a footnote that says, of course to 
the extent that the jury makes factual decisions that relate to punitive 
damages, we have to respect it. And of course, that’s what we’re 
saying about punitive damages that does not apply to compensatory 
damages, again recognizing that those damage determinations are the 
province of the jury. In fact, the same year as they decided Feltner, 
they decided another case called Hetzel v. Prince William County,11 
in which the Fourth Circuit had made a determination that the 
damages were really too great. That came up from the trial court, and 
therefore, they ordered a remittitur. When it went up to the Supreme 
Court, on a per curiam decision using the reexamination clause,12 
they said no, you can’t simply order remittitur without the offer of a 
new jury trial, otherwise you have not preserved the right to trial by 
jury as it is recognized in the Seventh Amendment. 
 
9 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851). 
10 Copper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Toll Grp., Inc. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
11 Hetzel v. Cty. of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 1996). 
12 Hetzel v. Prince William Cty., 523 U.S. 208 (1998). 
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So you can see how Horton doesn’t at all dovetail with these 
federal decisions. It doesn’t dovetail also with the kinds of issues that 
the other states grappled with in looking at damage caps. Now, 
Horton recites that twenty-two states have some form of damage cap. 
But let me say, as someone who has litigated many of these cases, not 
all damage caps are equal. There are some [damage caps]—one that 
was passed earlier this year in Iowa as well, which was based on a 
Massachusetts cap—which give entire discretion to the trial judge to 
allow the jury’s verdict, rather than the cap, to prevail. And as 
Massachusetts lawyers often tell everyone, they know of no trial 
judge who has ever overruled the jury and applied the cap. So you 
have those sorts of things. You have damage caps like the one in 
Ohio, which allows for catastrophic as well as wrongful death cases 
not to be subject to the cap.13 And you see very rare instances where 
the trial judge does not regard the injury as sufficiently catastrophic to 
allow the full jury verdict to apply. So no surprise that those caps 
have been upheld. 
[Turns to Justice Durham] I’m ready to be interrupted. 
WOLFF TO DURHAM: And when you’re done, I’ll be interrupted. 
DURHAM: OK. One of the things that puzzles me about the tactic 
by the Horton majority is this notion that it is the law that constrains 
the court in entering the judgment, and that the cap does not constrain 
the jury in its fact-finding function. What do you think that the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s response would be to a statute that said, in 
causes for defamation, the court shall enter an order for $1 in 
damages? That fits within the logical framework, it seems to me, of 
the Horton analysis, but I don’t understand what they’d do with that. 
PECK: Well, paltry sums seem to be part of the difficulty here. But, 
you know, the Court this morning—the U.S. Supreme Court—
accepted a case in which Congress directed the result of—now, many 
of us has thought that at least since the Civil War Era the court has 
said that Congress cannot do that—it’s a violation of separation of 
powers. At the same time of course, we always look, in takings cases 
for example, for the jury to determine the value of the property that 
you’ve lost, and the cause of action is a form of property. So you 
would think that if the State is taking a part of your verdict, that 
determination of the value of your property for some sort of public 
purpose, that there also is some sort of takings violation, and so that 
also is part of it. 
 
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (West 2017). 
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Now one of the things that bothered me, one of the many things 
that bothered me about the Horton majority’s decision, was the fact 
that it looked at each provision of the constitution in isolation. And 
the fact of the matter is that what we have there is a number of 
provisions that show that there’s a greater whole than the sum of its 
parts. And that is a traditional canon of interpretation in constitutional 
law. And so therefore you have to consider, what is it that the framers 
were trying to accomplish? And [we can] look at that also in terms of 
the two jury trial provisions in the Oregon Constitution. You can’t 
create the addition of a new provision of the constitution in 1910 as 
simply superfluous and doing nothing more than the constitution 
already did. As [Justice Wolff] said, the term “inviolate” is a very 
strong mandate; you can’t think of anything else that’s in a 
constitution that’s subject to “inviolate” protection. 
WOLFF: I think that one of things I picked up on in what you were 
just saying, and also Erwin’s point about the arbitration clauses and 
the diminution of the right to a jury trial, is the idea that there could 
be a substitutionary remedy. You can take it entirely out of the court 
system. And the example that’s sometimes given is workers’ 
compensation. I remember—thirty years ago or so—there was a 
number of proposals that we should have a workers’ compensation-
type scheme for medical malpractice. And then somebody did a study 
that was published in the New England Journal of Medicine of 
incidents of harm that were done in hospitals by reviewing hospital 
records over a period of years. 
DURHAM: The Harvard study, it was astonishing. 
WOLFF: Yes, it was fabulous; it was astonishing—and all of a 
sudden, whoops, we’re not going to do that. We can’t afford it 
because what they found was that almost, very, very few people who 
are seriously injured in medical settings actually brought a lawsuit. 
And so, they would be digging up a whole lot of claims. 
But the substitutionary remedy idea kind of baffles me a little bit, 
but, in part, because at common law there was a fellow servant rule. 
For those of you who remember way back in torts, you couldn’t be 
liable to a fellow servant. So that was not a substitutionary thing but 
rather a remedy that was created to take that piece of the common 
law, which was missing and put it back in. Now, my court over time, 
and I never attempted to correct them, has always said that it was 
substitutionary. That there was a preexisting common law remedy for 
injuries on the job. I’m not so persuaded by that. 
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PECK: Well, much of the justification for workers’ compensation 
as a substitute for a jury trial recognized that for the most part 
workers, while having a claim in negligence, would always lose it on 
the basis of contributory negligence. And so, therefore, this was a 
substitution. It used a quid pro quo analysis in almost every state that 
upheld it a century ago to say that employers got something, workers 
got something, and so therefore it works out, and so, again—due 
process or right to remedy types of analysis—it was upheld. But 
nowhere did anyone think that this was a violation of a right to trial 
by jury because it’s not about where you get to put your case but 
respecting the fact-finding function of the jury. And in all the cases 
that the Horton court, for instance, said was out of step with Lakin,14 
none of them, except a case involving a damage cap, takes a fact 
finding by the jury and eviscerates in favor of something that the 
legislature has done, which I regard as acting as a super judiciary. 
 
 
14 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 69, 987 P.2d 463, 468 (1999). 
